

A Secure and Scalable Internet Routing Architecture (SIRA)

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
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
1 Motivation

- Customer Networks, who act as source or sink for data packets, behave differently and have different needs from Provider Networks, whose primary role is to provide data transit service for customers.
- Customers and providers have different vulnerabilities and advantages with respect to scalability, security and traffic engineering.
- These problems may be simplified if customers and providers are de-coupled into **separate routing, forwarding** and **address** spaces
 - Customers have routes to only local subnets, direct providers, and directly connected customers.
 - Providers have routes to only other providers and directly connected customers.
 - Packets originating from customers cannot be addressed to provider devices.

3 Separating Customers from Providers



Why Separate?



2 Routing Problems Addressed by SIRA

Routing Infrastructure Security

- Customer systems can directly address core routers.
 - Thousands of low security end systems can target core routers (a.k.a., botnet attacks).
 - Besides, end systems have no reason to contact core routers!
- Customer networks directly influence routing in the core.
 - Malicious prefix hijacking attacks.
 - Mis-configuration errors.


Routing Scalability

- Customer networks and provider networks scale differently.
 - Providers grow slowly compared to customers.
 - Traffic engineering and multi-homing practices further increases customer growth.
- Local routing changes propagate globally.
 - A flap at customer network triggers several routing updates in the core.

Traffic Engineering

- Multi-homed customers would like to control how traffic enters and leaves their network.
- Providers have traffic engineering requirements and may be better suited to make routing decisions.
- Current network is a compromise between provider and customer objectives, resulting in conflicts and complexity.


How SIRA Separates Customers and Providers



Challenges for Mapping and Border Links

- Security of mapping service.
- Hierarchy (s.a. DNS) or DHT-based?
- How to express routing policies?
- Performance improvements: caching, prefetching?
- Links between CN and PN may change state (up/down, congestion etc)
 - How to convey this to sender?
 - Ex: Link between R2, C2 may be down
 - Need to tell Src

4 A Possible New Address Structure



SIRA Address Structure Inspired by Previous Proposals

Organization	Location	Subnet	Interface
OL	OL	OS	OI
LS	LI	SI	LI

OL - Organization-specific Location
 OS - Organization-specific Subnet
 LI - Location-specific Interface
 SI - Subnet-specific Interface

- Steve Deering. Metro-based Addressing: A Proposed Addressing Scheme for IPv6 Internet. Presentation, Xerox PARC, July 1995.
- Steve Deering. The Map & Encap Scheme for Scalable IPv4 Routing with Portable Site Prefixes. Presentation, Xerox PARC, March 1996.
- Mike O'Dell. GSE - An Alternate Addressing Architecture for IPv6. draft-ietf-ipngwg-gseaddr-00.txt, February 1997.